EasyPQC: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography

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Abstract

EasyCrypt is a formal verification tool used extensively for formalizing concrete security proofs of cryptographic constructions. However, the EasyCrypt formal logics consider only classical at- tackers, which means that post-quantum security proofs cannot be formalized and machine-checked with this tool. In this paper we prove that a natural extension of the EasyCrypt core logics permits capturing a wide class of post-quantum cryptography proofs, settling a question raised by (Unruh, POPL 2019). Leveraging our positive result, we implement EasyPQC, an extension of EasyCrypt for post-quantum security proofs, and use EasyPQC to verify post- quantum security of three classic constructions: PRF-based MAC, Full Domain Hash and GPV08 identity-based encryption.

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APA

Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Fan, X., Grégoire, B., Hung, S. H., Katz, J., … Zhou, L. (2021). EasyPQC: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 2564–2586). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484567

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