Abstract
At Crypto 93, Shamir proposed a family of signature schemes using algebraic bases. Coppersmith, Stern and Vaudenay presented an attack on one variant of the cryptosystem. Their attack does not recover the secret key. For one of the variants proposed by Shamir we show how to recover the secret key. Our attack is based on algebraic methods which are also applicable to many other instances of polynomial equations in the presence of some trapdoor condition.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Theobald, T. (1995). How to break shamir’s asymmetric basis. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 963, pp. 136–147). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44750-4_11
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