The Local Revolution under Second-Order Devolution: The Effect of County Governments on TANF Administration

Abstract

The subsequent research attempts to explore if and how county governments might be significant in administering welfare policy when discretion has devolved to these local governing bodies. First, I ask how descriptive representation might lead to substantive representation in local governments by examining how women and minorities serving on local governing bodies might affect TANF programmatic outcomes. I find that when the proportion of women serving on county boards is greater, TANF administration is less punitive. Second, I explore how local partisanship might affect programmatic outcomes, given that previous research demonstrates a strong relationship between local political leanings and the punitiveness of welfare policy. I find that the partisan leanings of the local governing body substantively affect welfare administration, where Republican-dominated boards institute more punitive welfare policy than their Democratic counterparts. Finally, I assess if and how electoral rules, like whether the local governing body is elected at large or to serve single-member districts, might affect program administration, finding that local governing bodies with a greater proportion of members serving single-member districts result in welfare participants being less likely to be sanctioned.