The importance of reasoning about recognizability has recently been stressed in finding type flaw attacks, in which a protocol message may be forged from another message. However, the problem of deciding recognizability has never been fully exploited. To fill this gap, we present a terminating procedure to decide recognizability under the standard Dolev-Yao model. By incorporating the proposed procedure with Athena, a well-know security protocol verifier, our experiments succeed in finding potential type flaw attacks. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Li, Z., & Wang, W. (2011). Deciding recognizability under Dolev-Yao intruder model. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6531 LNCS, pp. 416–429). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_35
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