Abstract
In light of the recent work of Micali and Reyzin on showing the subtleties and complexities of the soundness notions of zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols when the verifier has his public-key, we re-investigate the Cramer-Damgård intended-verifier identification scheme and show two man-in-the-middle attacks in some reasonable settings: one simple replaying attack and one ingenious interleaving attack. Our attacks are independent of the underlying hardness assumptions assumed. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.
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CITATION STYLE
Zhao, Y., Cheung, S. H. C., Zang, B., & Zhu, B. (2005). A note on the Cramer-Damgård identification scheme. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3828 LNCS, pp. 385–390). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_38
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