Differentiation as Design Principle and as Tool in the Political Management of European Integration

Abstract

The Euro Area, ‘Schengen’ Europe, ‘social’ Europe, and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represent the visible tip of an iceberg of differentiated integration that has grown up within the European Union (EU). Differentiated inte gration is one instrument for addressing a classic political problem of collective action: that in many circumstances an outcome that is clearly to the advantage of most or all concerned is blocked by the fact that one or more find better reason to veto the proposal. In this respect it belongs alongside two other instruments: ‘issue-linkage’ and side payments, both of which have been traditional instruments to facilitate integration in Europe by buying off opposition. For reasons outlined in this chapter, differentiation has been increasingly used in European integration. This book uncovers and analyses its incidence in functional and territorial terms and examines the value of competing explanations of differentiated integration.