We investigate the possibility to prove security of the well-known blind signature schemes by Chaum, and by Pointcheval and Stern in the standard model, i.e., without random oracles. We subsume these schemes under a more general class of blind signature schemes and show that finding security proofs for these schemes via black-box reductions in the standard model is hard. Technically, our result deploys meta-reduction techniques showing that black-box reductions for such schemes could be turned into efficient solvers for hard non-interactive cryptographic problems like RSA or discrete-log. Our approach yields significantly stronger impossibility results than previous meta-reductions in other settings by playing off the two security requirements of the blind signatures (unforgeability and blindness). © 2010 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Fischlin, M., & Schröder, D. (2010). On the impossibility of three-move blind signature schemes. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6110 LNCS, pp. 197–215). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5_10
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