Experiencing Embodied Cognition from the Outside

Abstract

Embodied cognition has been put forth as an alternative to mainstream approaches to cognitive psychology, which supporters claim do not and cannot consider perception and action. Are depictions of cognitive psychology put forth by embodied cognition proponents accurate? To answer this question, we summarize foundational research in cognitive psychology and show that it addresses many of the issues that are considered significant in embodied approaches. We distinguish simple embodiment from radical embodiment and argue that the former is not fundamentally different from mainstream cognitive psychology because it falls within a worldview called mechanism. Radical embodiment is fundamentally different because it falls within the worldview of contextualism, of which the radical empiricism endorsed by Gibson and radical behaviorism advocated by Skinner are varieties. We argue that the incorporation of concepts from Gibson’s ecological psychology within a representational approach leads to misleading claims and confusion. We conclude that researchers who espouse radical embodiment should accept all of its implications and researchers who endorse simple embodiment should accept that they are part of the same research enterprise as other cognitive psychologists.