In this paper I examine the relationship between Leibniz’s thinking on the infinite and his analysis of matter. After contrasting his views on these subjects with those of Georg Cantor, I outline Leibniz’s doctrine of the fictionality of infinite wholes and numbers by reference to his 1674 quadrature of the hyperbola, and defend its consistency against criticisms. In the third section I show how this same conception of the infinite informs Leibniz’s thesis of the actually infinite division of matter. I defend his views on aggregation from Russell’s criticism that they would make plurality a merely mental phenomenon, and expound Leibniz’s argument that body is aggregated from unities that are not themselves parts of matter, although they are presupposed by them. I then argue that these unities of substance make actual the parts of matter, according to Leibniz, by being the foundation of the motions that individuate the actual parts of matter from one instant to another.
CITATION STYLE
Arthur, R. T. W. (2015). Leibniz’s Actual Infinite in Relation to His Analysis of Matter. In Archimedes (Vol. 41, pp. 137–156). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9664-4_7
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