In this work, we consider a zero-sum game between an adaptive defender and a potentially deceptive attacker who is able to vary their degree of rationality as a deceptive ruse. Under this setup, we provide a complete characterization of the deception space of the attacker and uncover optimal strategies for adaptive defender against a deceptive attacker. In addition, we consider the setup in which both the attacker and defender are allowed to evolve their strategies over time. In this setting, one of our main results is to demonstrate that allowing the attacker to vary their degree of rationality can significantly impact the game in favor of the attacker.
CITATION STYLE
Gabrys, R., Bilinski, M., Mauger, J., Silva, D., & Fugate, S. (2023). Casino Rationale: Countering Attacker Deception in Zero-Sum Stackelberg Security Games of Bounded Rationality. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 13727 LNCS, pp. 23–43). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26369-9_2
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