Abstract
We present a traffic analysis of the ADU anonymity scheme presented at ESORICS 2008, and the related RADU scheme. We show that optimal attacks are able to de-anonymize messages more effectively than believed before. Our analysis applies to single messages as well as long term observations using multiple messages. The search of a "better" scheme is bound to fail, since we prove that the original Crowds anonymity system provides the best security for any given mean messaging latency. Finally we present D-Crowds, a scheme that supports any path length distribution, while leaking the least possible information, and quantify the optimal attacks against it. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
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CITATION STYLE
Danezis, G., Diaz, C., Käsper, E., & Troncoso, C. (2009). The wisdom of crowds: Attacks and optimal constructions. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5789 LNCS, pp. 406–423). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04444-1_25
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