One of the central questions in game theory deals with predicting the behavior of an agent. Here, we study the inverse of this problem: given the agents’ equilibrium behavior, what are possible utilities that motivate this behavior? We consider this problem in arbitrary normal-form games in which the utilities can be represented by a small number of parameters, such as in graphical, congestion, and network design games. In all such settings, we show how to efficiently, i.e. in polynomial time, determine utilities consistent with a given correlated equilibrium. However, inferring both utilities and structural elements (e.g., the graph within a graphical game) is in general NP-hard. From a theoretical perspective our results show that rationalizing an equilibrium is computationally easier than computing it; from a practical perspective a practitioner can use our algorithms to validate behavioral models.
CITATION STYLE
Kuleshov, V., & Schrijvers, O. (2015). Inverse game theory: Learning utilities in succinct games. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 9470, pp. 413–427). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_30
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