The De Facto Independence of Federal Offices of Inspector General

Abstract

The question of whether executive agencies can be subject to the control of politically elected legislators has been answered affirmatively, but it remains an open question whether legislators can likewise design an agency to be able to resist such control and influence. This article examines whether the de jure elements established for the system of U.S. federal offices of inspectors general (OIGs) adequately guard their role as independent and objective monitors of the agencies they oversee, and are reflected in their de facto independence from political pressures in the OIGs’ environments, operationalized as changes in the majority party in Congress, the presidency, and executive leadership. This research tests the self-reported outputs of 54 federal OIGs over a 10-and-a-half-year period to see if there are correlations between differences in inspector general (IG) appointment processes, OIGs’ environmental changes, and fluctuations in OIG outputs. Furthermore, it examines whether these results vary depending on whether the OIGs are performing pre factum audits or post factum investigations. Analyses show that OIGs with IGs appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate are more productive than those appointed by agency heads. Furthermore, federal OIGs’ productivity varies depending on who is president and with the OIGs’ proximity to the president, although pre factum audits and post factum investigations do not demonstrate similar patterns. This article sheds light on issues of institutional design and suggests an implicit political nature of pre factum oversight. Implications for policy and practice in the area of government accountability are discussed.