Mecanismos para compartir información crediticia: Evidencia internacional y la experiencia mexicana

Abstract

Mechanisms to share credit information, known as credit bureaus, reduce the effects of asymmetric information in the credit industry. When private credit bureaus do not spontaneously emerge, financial authorities often form a Public Registry of Credit Information (PRCI). The international experience that we present shows that there is a tight relationship between the development of the credit market and that of the mechanisms to share information. It also shows that countries with private bureaus have a more developed information system than those with a PRCI; additionally, there is a trend towards industry concentration. In Mexico, both the credit market and the mechanisms to share information have exhibited limited development. The Central Bank has managed a limited coverage PRCI since 1964; nevertheless, the credit expansion of the early nineties highlighted grave constraints in credit information. Consequently, from 1993 to 1998, financial authorities issued regulations to promote the entry of private bureaus. Three firms entered the market, but only one of them, the Credit Bureau (CB), has remained active. This firm is the result of a partnership between Mexican commercial banks, Trans Union and Dunn and Bradstreet. Based on Mexican banks' information and demand, the CB has grown rapidly, displacing the PRCI and filling part of the vacuum that existed at the level of consumer credit information. The BC's expansion has not resulted from an increase in credit, since there has been little generation of new information. Hence, it is feasible that this growth will reach a limit in the short run. This means that for the industry to develop, credit has to expand; additionally, if credit increases, the chances of competition in the credit information industry will grow.