The chapter discusses Antonio Damasio’s understanding of higher-level neurological and psychological functions in Self Comes to Mind (2010) and argues that the distinction he posits between regulatory (homeostatic) physiological structures and non-regulatory higher-level structures such as drives, motivations (and, ultimately, consciousness) presents philosophical and technical problems. The paper suggests that a purely regulatory understanding of drives and motivations (and, consequently, of cognition as well) as higher-order regulations could provide a unified theoretical framework capable of overcoming the old split between cognition and homeostasis that keeps resurfacing, under different guises, in the technical as well as in the non-technical understandings of consciousness and associated concepts.
CITATION STYLE
Franchi, S. (2016). Cognition as Higher-Order Regulation. In Synthese Library (Vol. 375, pp. 167–178). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23291-1_11
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