The SD-prenucleolus for TU-games: Coalitional monotonicity and core stability

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Abstract

The chapter introduces and analyses the Surplus Distributor-prenucleolus for TU games, a lexicographic value that satisfies core stability, strong aggregate monotonicity and null player out property in the class of balanced games. The solution is characterized in terms of balanced collection of sets and can be easily computed in the class of monotonic games with veto players and in the class of bankruptcy games. The SD-prenucleolus stands out as the only known core solution that satisfies coalitional monotonicity in the class of convex games and in the class of veto balanced games. Further, the SD-prekernel for TU games is introduced and analysed.

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Arin, J., & Katsev, I. (2018). The SD-prenucleolus for TU-games: Coalitional monotonicity and core stability. In Contributions to Management Science (pp. 301–321). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_14

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