How to Reduce Food Waste Caused by Normative Illusion? A Study Based on Evolutionary Game Model Analysis

Abstract

Reducing food waste is a priority for all sectors of society as it threatens national food security and the sustainability of global agriculture. Many studies on food waste have focused on a single subject, and the psychological factors of consumer waste are often overlooked. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces consumers’ normative illusion, constructs an evolutionary game model in which the government, caterers and consumers collaborate to reduce food waste, and simulates and analyses the behavioural strategies of the three stakeholders. The results show that: Firstly, food waste can be reduced under certain conditions by incentive-guided and punishment-inhibited policies. Moreover, incentive-guided policies can reduce government expenditures more than punishment-inhibited ones. Secondly, implementation of prior intervention, the resultant intervention and reducing the probability of consumers’ aversion to the intervention of caterers can optimise the government’s punishment-inhibited policy. Finally, under the punishment-inhibited policy, caterers can bear 60% of the prior intervention costs for food waste management. When caterers invest 40–60% of the prior intervention costs, both caterers and consumers can achieve the ideal state of cooperation; caterers can accept 40% of the resultant intervention cost for food waste management, and when the resultant intervention cost is less than 40%, consumers choose not to waste. Both caterers and consumers are involved in reducing food waste when the probability of consumer dissatisfaction with a caterer’s intervention is reduced to less than 40%.