Misrouted prophecy – On the impact of security attacks on PRoPHET

Abstract

In opportunistic networking, the wireless connectivity of mobile nodes is used to engage in opportunistic contacts, to exchange messages and thus to forward message in a store-carry-forward approach to a destination. Routing algorithms were developed with regards to the characteristics of these regularly partitioned networks. Network partitioning, no guarantee on device availability, and long delivery delays make these networks outstanding from traditional networks. In this paper, we investigate the behaviour of the prominent routing algorithm PRoPHET in opportunistic networks under different attack strategies. The attacks are performed by malicious nodes aimed at sabotaging the routing process in the network. Utilising ONE, the opportunistic network environment simulator, we conduct tests on these attacks and evaluate the outcomes of networks with malicious nodes compared to regular network behaviour. Through characteristic scenarios we document the behaviour of the network under attack. While in most cases the impact is tremendous, we also observe an interesting case of an attack causing an improved result in the network under attack.