Diversity and Dissent in Science: Does Democracy Always Serve Feminist Aims?

Abstract

Partly in response to feminist concerns about bias in science, there has been a recent trend towards viewing good science as democratic science (e.g., Kitcher 2001; Solomon 2001; Longino 2002). One similarity of these approaches is that democratic science is conceived of as what I will refer to as Millian science. Based on the epistemological views of John Stuart Mill (1859), ideal scientific communities are comprised of participants with diverse values who have equal authority in a `free marketplace of ideas' to advocate for different research directions, theories, and interpretations of data. This model of science has been taken to be attractive from a feminist perspective insofar as it can help eliminate male-bias and explain the importance of feminist perspectives in science. Focusing on the work of Miriam Solomon (1994, 2001), and Helen Longino (1990, 2002), I argue that a Millian conception of democratic science cannot ultimately address several feminist concerns within philosophy of science. An alternative conception of democratic science is then offered.