Universally Verifiable MPC and IRV Ballot Counting

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Abstract

We present a very simple universally verifiable MPC protocol. The first component is a threshold somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem that permits an arbitrary number of additions (in the source group), followed by a single multiplication, followed by an arbitrary number of additions in the target group. The second component is a black-box construction of universally verifiable distributed encryption switching between any public key encryption schemes supporting shared setup and key generation phases, as long as the schemes satisfy some natural additive-homomorphic properties. This allows us to switch back from the target group to the source group, and hence perform an arbitrary number of multiplications. The key generation algorithm of our prototypical cryptosystem, which is based upon concurrent verifiable secret sharing, permits robust re-construction of powers of a shared secret.

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Ramchen, K., Culnane, C., Pereira, O., & Teague, V. (2019). Universally Verifiable MPC and IRV Ballot Counting. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11598 LNCS, pp. 301–319). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32101-7_19

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