Beyond legitimate science: The case for policy-related science

Abstract

Though philosophy and sociology of science have argued for the non-neutral character of scientific knowledge and the social connotation of the scientific community, and have changed the perspective on scientific knowledge from validity to credibility, until recently, legal theorists and political scientists have looked at science as providing neutrality and objectivity, which appeared irremediably lacking in political and legal systems. Moreover, the enduring conception of the "republic of science" has shown science as an outstanding example of democracy (Ezrahi 1990; Merton 1968; Polanyi 1962). However, impasses have emerged in the legal regulation of science. In fact, dealing with scientific knowledge, law has to fill a number of cognitive gaps, since scientific data prove uncertain, insufficient or value-laden, and the question arises as to which methods law should use to evaluate and validate "good" science. Increasingly, the relationship between law and science appears as a multifaceted, complex one (Smith and Wynne 1989). Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) has been introduced as offering a unique chance for science and justice to meet, as far as it harmonises the often-divergent aims of objectivity, equity and patient preferences. The authors position towards this easy view of EBM is quite critical (industry-driven research, medical paternalism, etc), though they acknowledge that deeper awareness in implementing EBM could improve both professional practice and respect for patients. I shall briefly explore this problem from a different perspective, namely the role that science and experts play in the courts. In fact, while the legal vision of science is undergoing a dramatic paradigm shift, both in the US and in Europe, legal reliance on scientific standards and methods is endowed with ambiguities. Referring to well-grounded, widely accepted scientific standards and methods, may result in a more self-reflexive attitude towards the mix of scientific and legal facts-and-values that merge in concrete decisions namely, it may give rise to a reduction of scientific and legal arbitrariness, and to substantially more legitimate legal decisions. In contrast, referring to scientific standards as a shortcut to legitimising opaque legal choices means treating science and law as powers for manipulating people, and not as open and transparent forms of knowledge and agreements on values in democratic societies namely, betraying science and law by black-boxing them. In this perspective, I would also argue for what has been called the democratisation of science (extended scientific expertise and public participation in science-based decisions). © 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.