SYMPOSIUM ONTHE IMMUNITY of STATE OFFICIALS,HORIZONTAL ENFORCEMENT and the ILC'S PROPOSED DRAFT ARTICLESON the IMMUNITY of STATE OFFICIALS from FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

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Abstract

The Nuremberg principles affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly and formulated by the International Law Commission (ILC) provide that [t]he fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him (sic) from responsibility under international law. Few would dispute this basic principle. More contested is the question of who has authority to impose consequences on individuals for international crimes committed on behalf of states. This is because, if an individual has acted with actual or apparent state authority, imposing consequences on the individual without her state's consent runs counter to traditional notions of state sovereignty and noninterference.

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Keitner, C. I. (2015). SYMPOSIUM ONTHE IMMUNITY of STATE OFFICIALS,HORIZONTAL ENFORCEMENT and the ILC’S PROPOSED DRAFT ARTICLESON the IMMUNITY of STATE OFFICIALS from FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION. In AJIL Unbound (Vol. 109, pp. 161–166). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2398772300001367

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