Revisiting Flavell’s Theory of Metacognition for Metacognitive Responsiveness

Abstract

The theory of metacognition was innovative at the time for its promising practicality. However, research findings that pertain to inconsistencies in metacognitive trainings’ outcomes and mainstream classrooms’ adversities of metacognition practices have accumulated since then. These issues may highlight a need to revise metacognition theory. From a phenomenological perspective, this paper first describes the fundamental tenant of theory; thinking and whether thinking about thinking recognizes the nature of thinking. For individuals to manage their thinking, thinking should be stimulated first. Metacognitive responsiveness pertains to a conscious sensitivity towards a stimulus that might engage one into higher order thinking. Metacognitive responsiveness, thereby, may initiate attendance of attending higher order thinking in recognition of a stimulus. Thinking and metacognitive responsiveness pertain to personal relevance, attentiveness, interest, previous experiences, tools for thinking, features of tasks, and the nature of social interactions. In this sense, the stimulus should be designed or adapted to initiate each individual’s thinking or metacognitive responsiveness. This paper argues that the theory of metacognition needs a revision to embrace metacognitive responsiveness explicitly, and practical implications need to focus on materials to initiate metacognitive responsiveness for metacognitive development.