General will and collective decision in Rousseau

Abstract

In rousseauian terms, the fundamental question about what we should collectively do (i.e., the problem of collective decision-making) translates itself as the question about how we could know what the general will is. This question, however, can only be adequately answered if we consider that "general will" has a double meaning. Rousseau uses the same expression to refer to two quite different things: to the collective decisions themselves consubstantiated in the law ("gw-as a decision") and to the common good as a pattern which, in a way, exists before and independently of the decisions, functioning as a reference to the decision-making procedure ("gw-as a pattern"). The general question about how could we know what the general will is, then, should be split into two: How can we get to know the gw-as a decision? and How can we get to know the gw-as a pattern? This article intends to identify the central elements of Rousseau's answer to this two questions, which throw an interesting light on the rousseauian conception of democracy.