We give a polynomial time attack on the McEliece public key cryptosystem based on subcodes of algebraic geometry (AG) codes. The proposed attack reposes on the distinguishability of such codes from random codes using the Schur product. Wieschebrink treated the genus zero case a few years ago but his approach cannot be extent straightforwardly to other genera. We address this problem by introducing and using a new notion, which we call the t-closure of a code.
CITATION STYLE
Couvreur, A., Márquez-Corbella, I., & Pellikaan, R. (2015). Cryptanalysis of Public-Key Cryptosystems That Use Subcodes of Algebraic Geometry Codes (pp. 133–140). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17296-5_13
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.