Mixed-signal hardware security: Attacks and countermeasures for ∆Σ ADC

Abstract

Mixed-signal integrated circuits (ICs) play an eminent and critical role in design and development of the embedded systems leveraged within smart weapons and military systems. These ICs can be a golden target for adversaries to compromise in order to function maliciously. In this work, we study the security aspects of a tunnel field effect transistor (TFET)-based first-order one-bit delta-sigma (∆Σ) analog to digital converter (ADC) through proposing four attack and one defense models. The first attack manipulates the input signal to the ∆Σ modulator. The second attack manipulates the analog version of the modulator output bit and is triggered by the noise signal. The third attack manipulates the modulator output bit and has a controllable trigger mechanism. The fourth attack manipulates the analog version of the modulator output bit and is triggered by a victim capacitance within the chip. For the defense, a number of signal processing filters are used in order to purge the analog version of the modulator output bit for elimination of the malicious unwanted features, introduced by the attacks. According to the simulation results, the second threat model displays the strongest attack. Derived from the countermeasure evaluation, the best filter to confront the threat models is the robust regression using the least absolute residual computing method.