The ontogeny of retroactive inference: Piagetian and peircean accounts

Abstract

Like Peirce, Piaget posits that the type of problem-solving truly retrospective in nature is embedded in action schemes (Empirical and Pseudoempirical Abstraction), inducing increasingly diverse courses of action, and spontaneous explanations. Piaget insists that working from the consequence to determine the premises (Retroactive Reasoning) represents a formidable means to develop viable hypotheses which rest upon the means to reverse and compensate in novel ways. He accounts for amplified social and logical reasoning in the face of unexpected consequences (Reflecting/Reflected Abstraction), when reasoning extends beyond present appearances to incorporate diverse orientations, e.g., changes in event participants’ location/orientation and object motility/dimension modifications, e.g., changes in mass do not automatically result in form alterations. Children propose arguments (identity, reversibility, compensation), illustrating objective explanations for changes in appearances. Afterward, children assert others’ epistemic, and deontic idiosyncrasies (as bystanders). This form of Reflected Abstraction unequivocally demonstrates modal logic; it is free from perceptual constraints. These perspective-taking competencies ultimately trigger well-founded recommendations for diverse courses of action in would-be events (West 2014a; West 2014b), representing Piaget’s commitment to germinating plausible hypotheses. For Peirce, recommending courses of action independent of experiencing them (MS 637: 1909) embodies his pragmatic maxim.