Moral intuitionism and empirical data

Abstract

In this article, it is argued that empirical data can undermine normative arguments generated by intuitionist methodologies that involve a step of inducing an abstract principle from a set of case-based moral intuitions. The use of case-based intuitions in normative theory construction is conceptualized here as an inductive inference procedure in which philosophers draw conclusions from introspectively observable data (their intuitions) to the state of a latent variable (what morality actually requires). We argue that such a procedure can only generate valid output if it can be applied objectively in the sense that its outcome is independent of the person who carries it out. This requirement is only met when fundamental case-based intuitions are intersubjectively shared to a relevant degree. At this point, empirical data comes into play. It is needed to assess the degree to which specific intuitions are actually intersubjectively shared. In contexts in which this requirement is not met, principles resulting from this method cannot be argued to be valid representations of what morality actually requires. We illustrate this argument with a concrete example from the literature in which a specific normative principle is called into question on the basis of psychological data on laypeople's moral intuitions. Furthermore, we defend the argument against potential objections, and we discuss its relationship to other criticisms of moral intuitionism as well as its implications for intuitionist methodologies in general.