Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives

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Abstract

We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We argue that rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority criterion. We define top-k-counting committee scoring rules and show that the fixed-majority consistent rules are a subclass of the top-k-counting rules. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a top-k-counting rule to satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. We show that, for many top-k-counting rules, the complexity of winner determination is high (formally, we show that the problem of deciding if there exists a committee with at least a given score is NP -hard), but we also show examples of rules with polynomial-time winner determination procedures. For some of the computationally hard rules, we provide either exact FPT algorithms or approximate polynomial-time algorithms.

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Faliszewski, P., Skowron, P., Slinko, A., & Talmon, N. (2018). Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives. Social Choice and Welfare, 51(3), 513–550. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1126-4

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