Selfish load balancing under partial knowledge

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Abstract

We consider n selfish agents or players, each having a load, who want to place their loads to one of two bins. The agents have an incomplete picture of the world: They know some loads exactly and only a probability distribution for the rest. We study Nash equilibria for this model, we compute the Price of Anarchy for some cases and show that sometimes extra information adversely affects the Divergence Ratio (a kind of subjective Price of Anarchy). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.

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Koutsoupias, E., Panagopoulou, P. N., & Spirakis, P. G. (2007). Selfish load balancing under partial knowledge. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4708 LNCS, pp. 609–620). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74456-6_54

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