Avicenna on Self-Awareness and Knowing that One Knows

  • Black D
N/ACitations
Citations of this article
28Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

One of the most well-known elements of Avicenna's philosophy is the famous thought experiment known as the " Flying Man. " The Flying Man argument attempts to show that the soul possesses innate awareness of itself, and it has often been viewed as forerunner to the Cartesian cogito. But Avicenna's reflections on the nature of self-awareness and self-consciousness are by no means confined to the various versions of the Flying Man. Two of Avicenna's latest works, the Investigations and the Notes, contain numerous discussions of the soul's awareness of itself. From an examination of these works I show that Avicenna recognizes two distinct levels of self-knowledge: (1) primitive self-awareness, which is illustrated by the Flying Man; and (2) reflexive self-awareness, which comes from our awareness of cognizing some object other than ourselves. While Avicenna assigns primitive self-awareness a central role in ensuring the unity of the soul's operations, he encounters a number of difficulties in his efforts to explicate the relation of primitive self-awareness to the reflexive varieties of self-knowledge that he inherits from the Aristotelian tradition.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Black, D. L. (2008). Avicenna on Self-Awareness and Knowing that One Knows. In The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition (pp. 63–87). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8405-8_3

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free