Relationships Among Logic, Dialectic and Rhetoric

Abstract

The chapter is an account of the relationships of the three fields or perspectives: logic, dialectic and rhetoric. I first explain the senses of these terms as they are used in the chapter. My thesis is that there is no one type of relationship among these three, but rather several—at least four, and there may be more. One is a conceptual or logical relation, for instance such that the properties of any one are logically independent of those of the others. A second is a contingent or empirical relationship, for instance such that there is a contingent correlation of some of the properties of one perspective with those of another. A third is a relationship of normative priority, such that for instance dialectical norms are always overriding. A fourth is a relationship of theoretical priority, such that for instance that the rhetorical perspective is theoretically basic. For each of these types of ways the three can be related, the question arises as to how they in fact are related. For each type there is not always only one way the three are related.