Abstract
Article Outline: Glossary Definition of the Subject Introduction The Collective Choice Problem Voting Rules Welfare Economics Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Political Ignorance and the Condorcet Jury Theorem Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Political Competition and Strategic Voting The Common Value Setting with Strategic Agents Future Directions Bibliography
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CITATION STYLE
APA
Sandroni, A., Pogach, J., Tincani, M., Penta, A., & Selman, D. (2012). Voting. In Computational Complexity: Theory, Techniques, and Applications (Vol. 9781461418009, pp. 3280–3290). Springer New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_203
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