Following both theoretical and practical arguments, we construct UC-secure bit-commitment protocols that place their strength on the sender's side and are built using tamper-evident devices, e.g., a type of distinguishable, sealed envelopes. We show that by using a second formalisation of tamper-evident distinguishable envelopes we can attain better security guarantees, i.e., EUC-security. We show the relations between several flavours of weak bit-commitments, bit-commitments and distinguishable tamper-evident envelopes. We focus, at all points, on the lightweight nature of the underlying mechanisms and on the end-to-end human verifiability. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Boureanu, I., & Vaudenay, S. (2012). Several weak bit-commitments using seal-once tamper-evident devices. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7496 LNCS, pp. 70–87). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33272-2_6
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