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The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions

Journal of Economic Theory (1998) 82(1) 144-166
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2425
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Abstract

With private and affiliated buyer's values, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within a large family of sequential bidding mechanisms, named "Simple Sequential Auctions."Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82. © 1998 Academic Press.

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Lopomo, G. (1998). The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 82(1), 144–166. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2425

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