Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size

Abstract

1. Abstract Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e. , no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (i.e., where who exists does depend on what choice an agent makes). More specifically, we shall develop and discuss it in the context of a person -affecting framework—in which an option is just if and only if it wrongs no one according to certain plausible conditions on wrongi 2. The General Framework We shall assume that there is a finite number of possible people, a subset of which exists for any given option. Moreover, we shall restrict our attention to cases where there is no uncertainty concerning the outcomes of choices. To fully specify an egalitarian theory, one must specify the type of benefits that it seeks to equalize. Throughout the paper, however, we will leave open the relevant conception of benefit (resources, primary goods, brute luck well-being, etc.). References to a person being worse off than another should be understood in terms of the relevant benefits. We shall assume, for the sake of argument, that benefits are ratio scale measurable and fully interpersonally comparable. The exact informational requirements, however, will depend Discussion Paper 13/2005