We study a problem of secure data storage on hardware that may leak information. We introduce a new primitive, that we call leakage-resilient storage (LRS), which is an (unkeyed) scheme for encoding messages, and can be viewed as a generalization of the All-Or-Nothing Transform (AONT, Rivest 1997). The standard definition of AONT requires that it should be hard to reconstruct a message m if not all the bits of its encoding Encode(m) are known. LRS is defined more generally, with respect to a class Γ of functions. The security definition of LRS requires that it should be hard to reconstruct m even if some values g 1(Encode(m)),.., g t (Encode(m)) are known (where g 1,..,g t Γ), as long as the total length of g 1(Encode(m)),..,g t (Encode(m)) is smaller than some parameter c. We construct an LRS scheme that is secure with respect to Γ being a set of functions that can depend only on some restricted part of the memory. More precisely: we assume that the memory is divided in 2 parts, and the functions in Γ can be just applied to one of these parts. We also construct a scheme that is secure if the cardinality of Γ is restricted (but still it can be exponential in the length of the encoding). This construction implies security in the case when the set Γ consists of functions that are computable by Boolean circuits of a small size. We also discuss the connection between the problem of constructing leakage-resilient storage and a theory of the compressibility of NP-instances. © 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Davì, F., Dziembowski, S., & Venturi, D. (2010). Leakage-resilient storage. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6280 LNCS, pp. 121–137). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15317-4_9
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