Cooperation in the One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma Based on Expectations of Reciprocity

  • WATABE M
  • TERAI S
  • HAYASHI N
  • et al.
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Abstract

Conducted 2 experiments to test the hypothesis that the cooperation rate of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) players would be affected by their illusion of control (D. Karp et al, 1993). Human Ss: 148 normal male and female Japanese adults (undergraduate students) (Exp 1). 48 normal male and female Japanese adults (undergraduate students) (Exp 2). A sequential PD situation was used in which 1 player decided before the other player to minimize or maximize the feasibility of the illusion of control. Ss' degree of cooperation and control was compared with the behaviors of players of ordinary simultaneous 1-shot PD situations. (English abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2002 APA, all rights reserved)

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APA

WATABE, M., TERAI, S., HAYASHI, N., & YAMAGISHI, T. (1996). Cooperation in the One-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Based on Expectations of Reciprocity. THE JAPANESE JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 36(2), 183–196. https://doi.org/10.2130/jjesp.36.183

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