A Hard-to- Escape Situation Informal Pacts, Kingpin Strategies, and Collective Violence in Mexico

Abstract

Mexico has for an extended period been experiencing homicide rates above, or close to, epidemic levels. Instead of examining why formal institutional reform geared at strengthening democracy has not helped to foment peace and security, as most of the research on collective violence in Latin America and the Caribbean does, this paper focuses on the gap between formal and informal institutions, and continuities rather than points of rupture. I argue that in Mexico, there is a gap between formal institutions (which define how the country should be) and informal institutions (which constrain actual strategic choices). I apply a path-dependence approach to examine what factors have been reproducing collective violence over time, finding that the prevalence of protection rackets (operated by non-state actors at the subnational level) and the use of kingpin strategies (both by state and non-state actors) explain collective violence in the past but also in the present. In the past decades, informal pacts and kingpin strategies have changed in Mexico, but they have survived and adapted to the new formally democratic institutional setting. For the period 1989-2017, I identify three critical junctures that changed the rules of the game, four mechanisms of inertia, and two factors of lock-in that make it difficult to reduce collective violence.