Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária

Abstract

This article challenges the interpretations concerning participation by Brazilian legislators in the budget process focused on incentives generated by the electoral legislation. We show that the rules and regulations governing the budget process affect the distribution of funds both between branches of government and within the legislative branch itself. Constitutional and legal rules preserve the original proposal submitted by the Executive. Within Congress, the bylaws favor collective participation of members, for example, by way of submission of amendments by State representations. We further show that participation by the legislative branch in the budget process can only be understood when the political parties are taken into account. Coordination of efforts by the political parties thus ends up grouping them in two major blocs, pro-administration and opposition. In other words, partisan participation in the budget process depends on the parties' relations with the Executive. Thus, the strategy adopted by the majority supporting the Executive takes into account their contribution to the success of policies sponsored by the administration of which they are a part.