Abstract
In this paper several attacks are presented that allow information to be derived on faults injected at the beginning of cryptographic algorithm implementations that use Boolean masking to defend against Differential Power Analysis (DPA). These attacks target the initialisation functions that are used to enable the algorithm to be protected, allowing a fault attack even in the presence of round redundancy. A description of the experiments leading to the development of these attacks is also given. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Amiel, F., Clavier, C., & Tunstall, M. (2006). Fault analysis of DPA-resistant algorithms. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4236 LNCS, pp. 223–236). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11889700_20
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