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Using Experimental Data to Model Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games

  • Lin H
  • Sunder S
Springer US, (2002), 373-397
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4757-5196-3_16
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Abstract

In ultimatum games two players bargain anonymously to divide a fixed amount between them, using a computer or human intermediary for communication. One player (proposer) proposes a division of the “pie” and the other player (responder) decides whether to...

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Lin, H., & Sunder, S. (2002). Using Experimental Data to Model Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games. In Experimental Business Research (pp. 373–397). Springer US. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5196-3_16

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