In this paper we show that any two-party functionality can be securely computed in a constant number of rounds, where security is obtained against malicious adversaries that may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification. This is in contrast to Yao's constant-round protocol that ensures security only in the face of semi-honest adversaries, and to its malicious adversary version that requires a polynomial number of rounds. In order to obtain our result, we present a constant-round protocol for secure coin-tossing of polynomially many coins (in parallel). We then show how this protocol can be used in conjunction with other existing constructions in order to obtain a constant-round protocol for securely computing any two-party functionality. On the subject of coin-tossing, we also present a constant-round perfect coin-tossing protocol, where by "perfect" we mean that the resulting coins are guaranteed to be statistically close to uniform (and not just pseudorandom). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001.
CITATION STYLE
Lindell, Y. (2001). Parallel coin-tossing and constant-round secure two-party computation. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 2139 LNCS, pp. 171–189). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44647-8_10
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