As the core operation of many public key cryptosystems, group exponentiation is central to cryptography. Attacks on its implementation in embedded device setting is hence of great concern. Recently, implementations resisting both simple side-channel analysis and fault attacks were proposed. In this paper, we go further and present an algorithm that also inherently thwarts differential side-channel attacks in finite abelian groups with only limited time and storage overhead. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.
CITATION STYLE
Fumaroli, G., & Vigilant, D. (2006). Blinded fault resistant exponentiation. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4236 LNCS, pp. 62–70). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11889700_6
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