A common assumption in security research is that more individual expertise unambiguously leads to a more secure overall network. We present a game-theoretic model in which this common assumption does not hold. Our findings indicate that expert users can be not only invaluable contributors, but also free-riders, defectors, and narcissistic opportunists. A direct application is that user education needs to highlight the cooperative nature of security, and foster the community sense, in particular, of higher skilled computer users. As a technical contribution, this paper represents, to our knowledge, the first formal study to quantitatively assess the impact of different degrees of information security expertise on the overall security of a network. © 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Johnson, B., Grossklags, J., Christin, N., & Chuang, J. (2010). Are security experts useful? Bayesian Nash equilibria for network security games with limited information. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6345 LNCS, pp. 588–606). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_36
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