Abstract
We revisit the e-voting protocol IVXV that is used for legally-binding political elections in Estonia from a privacy perspective. We demonstrate that IVXV is vulnerable to attacks against vote privacy in those threat scenarios that were considered for IVXV originally. We explain how to improve IVXV so that it protects against the privacy issues we discovered.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Müller, J. (2023). Breaking and Fixing Vote Privacy of the Estonian E-Voting Protocol IVXV. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 13412 LNCS, pp. 325–334). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32415-4_22
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