The universality of experiential consciousness

Abstract

It is argued that of Block's (On a confusion about a function of consciousness, 1995; The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, 1997) two types of consciousness, namely phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness) and access consciousness (a-consciousness), that p-consciousness applies to all living things but that a-consciousness is uniquely human. This differs from Block's assertion that a-consciousness also applies to some non-human organisms. It is suggested that p-consciousness, awareness, experience and perception are basically equivalent and that human consciousness has in addition to percept-based p-consciousness, concept-based a-consciousness, a verbal and conceptual form of consciousness that can be utilized to coordinate, organize and plan activities for rational decision-making. This argument is based on Logan's (The Extended Mind: The Emergence of Language, The Human Mind and Culture, 1997) assertion that humans are uniquely capable of reasoning and rationality because they are uniquely capable of verbal language and hence the ability to conceptualize.