European attitudes towards transatlantic relations 2000-2003: An analytical survey: Prepared for the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers, Rhodes and Kastellorizo, 2-4 may 2003

Abstract

The European see-saw of hope and frustration. Part 1 of the study looks broadly at transatlantic relations during the first two years of the George W. Bush administration. It recalls how the concern about the likely foreign policy direction taken by Bush was confirmed by his stance on the Kyoto Protocol and the decision to push ahead with the missile defence project. Hopes that the 11 September attacks could be an opportunity to cajole the United States in a more multilateralist direction were soon frustrated by the increasingly hawkish line on Iraq, confirmed in the State of the Union address of January 2002. Signs of relative European unity rapidly disappeared as the showdown with Iraq moved closer. Analysing recent developments in Europe. Part 2 observes that responses from European states-both current and prospective EU members-to the imminent war with Iraq showed a re-emergence of the classic Europeanist-Atlanticist division on the shape of the transatlantic security architecture. Nonetheless, it also points out that on many non-military foreign policy issues, the EU is able to foster relatively united and effective positions. The nature of EU-US divisions. Part 3 engages with the notion that the future of EU-US relations is being determined by deep divisions in political values between Europe and the United States which help to shape their relative international power. At public opinion level, we find little evidence to back assertions of fundamentally different world-views, and much hostility aimed at the Bush administration rather than America or Americans in general. While at government level, there are major transatlantic divisions over how to achieve international objectives, the nature of those international objectives is not radically different. We further suggest that the measurement of power in terms of military strength is an inadequate way of gauging European potential on the international stage, as a number of recent European figures have pointed out. Recommendations. Our final recommendations centre less on immediate means to reduce transatlantic tensions-for example, the need for a calming in rhetoric on both sides-than on issues of longer-term institutional behaviour and the need for clearer strategic thinking and positioning: 1. The EU must as far as possible practice internally in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) what it preaches externally about multilateral and collective decision-making. A more closely-defined series of EU foreign policy ambitions may facilitate this. 2. 2. Care must be taken in designing an institutional foreign policy framework that allows enough flexibility to avoid instances of uni-lateral action or action by small groups being seen as a failure for CFSP. 3. 3. In order to help the EU to define its ambitions and roles in the foreign policy domain, a high-level working group should be created with the aim of surveying views within the Union and con-sidering the possibility of an EU security plan.