Vulnerability of Social Norms to Incomplete Information

Abstract

The ability of groups to self-govern their common pool resources is well documented\r(Ostrom, 1990). Whether common pool resources are fish stocks or freshwater or\rforest products, success of self-governance relates to the ability of appropriators to\rdevelop trust relationships, monitor and enforce agreements, and communicate\ramong each other.\rIn this chapter we look at the consequences of a specific element of self-governance,\rnamely, the effect of visibility of the activities on the ability of groups\rto cooperate. The availability of information about appropriation of actors from a\rcommon pool resource can affect the success of self-governance. Resource users\rmay not see each others’ actions directly in the appropriation of forests or fish stock.\rDue to the incompleteness of information resource users need to infer actions of\rothers from the limited information they have.