Governing in the Shadow of Bosman: A Principal-Agent Perspective on Sports Governance and the EU

Abstract

This contribution investigates the EU's (potential) role in sports governance by building upon insights from the Principal-Agent model. Highlighting the influence of Bosman, it explores the limitations and opportunities of the EU's power in relation to sports governing bodies (SGBs). Two EU bodies, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Commission, are conceptualised as principals and SGBs are conceptualised as agents. It shows that the EU is able to use the shadow of Bosman to influence the behaviour of SGBs because these bodies fear the costs of the ultimate EU sanction: a second Bosman case. However, drawing from the literature on the EU as a market power, this contribution demonstrates that several factors negatively influence the credible occurrence and magnitude of sanctions, limiting the EU's capacity to influence SGBs' behaviour. Moreover, it shows how SGBs are able to diminish the shadow of Bosman through a variety of strategies. The chapter concludes by offering concrete policy advice, indicating that there is certainly room for a more ambitious EU sports policy-devised and supported by the Member States directed at SGBs.